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THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1956
T HE Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,1 designed principally
to regulate the expansion of bank holding companies and to insure
the separation of banking and nonbanking enterprises,' is perhaps the
most important banking legislation of the past two decades. The im-
mediate economic consequences of the act are themselves deserving of
comment, 3 but, even more significantly, the act represents the first
comprehensive congressional action with regard to multiple banking
through the use of the holding company. Though of comparatively
recent origin,4 the bank holding company device has become as prom-
inent as both the other forms of multiple banking, chains5 and branches,6
largely because of the economic inadequacies of the former 7 and the
legal restrictions imposed upon the latter.8 A brief historical survey
of bank holding company -development will serve to highlight an
analysis of the act itself.
Historically, the independent, unit bank, with its welfare dependent
upon the economic health of the small area it serves, has too frequently
been unable to withstand the adverse affect of even brief, localized eco-
nomic depression2 Particularly in the small towns of the agrarian
West and South during the i92O's and 193O's, bank suspensions occurred
at an astonishing rate." Some form of multiple banking which could
70 STAT. 133, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-48 (Supp. 1956).
sS. REP. No. 1095, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (.955).
s See note 131 infra.
'The first independently capitalized bank holding company was the Marine Ban-
corporation organized in Seattle, Washington in 1927. CARTINHOURp, BRANCH, GROUP
AND CHAIN BANKING 96 (935).
'Chain banking is the term employed to describe the control by an individual or
group of individuals of two or more banks. Hearings Before the House Committee on
Banking and Currenay, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. i, at 26.
' A branch bank is a single corporate entity although having numerous offices or
branches performing the usual banking functions. WILLIT, CHAIN, GROUP AND BRANCH
BANKING 15 (1930).
'See note 12 infra and text thereto.
s See notes 13, 14 infra.
For general discussion of the plight of the unit bank, see OSTROLENK, THE Eco-
NoMIcs OF BRANCH BANKING, 27-49 (1930) ; CARTINHOUR, op. cit. supra note 4, at
18-33.
10 The ten states suffering the most bank suspensions in the period 1921-29 and the
number of banks suspended in each state were: Iowa (528), North Dakota (429), Min-
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afford greater oRportunity for diveisification of lending risks, as well as
a reservoir of assistance in times of economic crisis, was deemed in-
dispensable if banking facilities were to continue in many areas. Bankers
were, thus, faced with a choice of three forms of multiple banking:
chain, branch, and group or holding company banking. Chain banking
was not an attractive choice, partially because of the public disfavor
engendered by the collapse of some of the early chains,"1 but principally
because of the limited emergency assistance which could be anticipated
from even the wealthiest individuals. 12  Branch banking, though con-
cededly more efficient in operation than the holding company device,"
was either prohibited or severely restricted in many states 4 and could
not serve as the basis for interstate operations.15 As a result, group
banking emerged as a significant form of multiple banking in the late
I92o's.16 Its development has prompted extended consideration of its
economic utility by economists as well as the banking profession, thus
facilitating a summary of the contentions of both those favoring and
nesota (411), South Dakota (394), Nebraska (339), Georgia (319), Texas (299), Mis-
souri (z96), Oklahoma (267) and South Carolina (227). These ten states suffered
62% of the bank suspensions in the United States during this period. Hearings, supra
note 5, Pt. 4 at 418.
"Hearings, supra note 5, pt. I, at 26; See CARTINHOUR, op. cit. supra note 4, at
58-59, 82-89; HOGENSON, THE ECONOMIcs op GRoup BANKING 2-3, 36 (1955).
" Cf. CHAPMAN AND WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 321 (1942).
"Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 9, at 1238; pt. ix, at 1464. OsTROLENK, o1. cit.
supra note 9, at 56-57. While conceding that a holding company system with its
individually incorporated affiliates is less efficient than branch banking, proponents of
group banking contend that this very fact renders group banking less susceptible to
the charge of "absentee banking," a criticism often made of both branch and group
operation. HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note xi, at 178. See note 23 infra.
' In 1930, only nine states permitted statewide branch banking; ten others restricted
branching to a limited area, usually the town or county in which the main office was
located; twenty-two states expressly prohibited branch banking, and the remaining
seven states had no applicable provision. Hearings, supra note 5, Pt. 4, at 463.v
'5 The McFadden Act permitted branching by national banks only to the extent
permitted by state law. 44 STAT. 1228 (1927), x U.S.C. § 36(c) (1952).
" HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note xx, at x. See note 4 supra. The subsequent
growth of bank holding companies, however, has not been as substantial as the vehem-
ence of the criticism directed at them would seem to indicate. In fact, the number of
banking offices controlled by major holding companies actually declined 1933-54. Hear-
ings Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 91
(1955). Similarly, 1946-54, the amount of deposits held by holding company affiliates
declined. Id. at 92. It should be noted, however, that both these figures would have
increased had not Transamerica relinquished its holdings in Bank of America N.T. &
S.A., a branch with 492 branches and over $5 billion of deposits at December 31, 1946.
Id. at 346.
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those opposed to the use of the holding company device in the field of
banking.1 7
Undoubtedly, a well-managed bank holding company system offers
certain distinct advantages to its banking subsidiary and to the latter's
depositors and borrowers. The holding company typically affords its
affiliate investment and management counsel of a quality and scope
normally unavailable to the independent banker.'" Moreover, the affili-
ate is enabled effectively to extend its line of credit beyond statutory
limitations through its "quasi-correspondent" relationship with the other
banks of the group.'9 Through quantity purchases, the parent company
is often able to effect substantial reductions in the overhead and admin-
inistrative expenses of its subsidiaries.2 ° Finally, in time of crisis, the
holding company stands ready to lend financial assistance to any of its
threatened affiliates. 2 '
Notwithstanding their certain economic utility, bank holding com-
panies have been vehemently denounced from their inception, principally
by the opponents of multiple banking in any form, who apprehend a
nation-wide monopoly of credit facilities in the uncontrolled expansion
of bank holding companies.22 Moreover, it is urged that bank holding
companies unfamiliar with local conditions and unsolicitous of local
needsm foster an undesirable "absentee" bafnking. Despite the severity
and scope of such criticism, no important effort to check the expansion
of group banking was made on the federal level until 1938,24 when the
17See generally, HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note i i at 136-5o i CHAPMAN AND WEST-
E FIELD, off. cit. supra note 12, at 329-325 CARTINHOUR, op. Cit. supra note 4, at
216-55.
18 CARTINHOUR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 216-iS, 221-22. Hearings, supra note
16, at 46o, 634; Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 9, at 178.
'9 HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note is, at 141-42.
o CARTINHOUP, 0p. Cit. supra note 4, at 229-31.
'Id. at 232-38.
" "Through the holding company device most of the safeguards erected since the
bank difficulties of the early 1930's may be easily evaded by men who think primarily
of monopoly power and large profits." Hearings, supra note 16, at 227. "(T)he
holding company is a diabolical instrument destructive of our old system of banking,
directly and indirectly, and the father of a movement that, if unchecked may unduly
concentrate the credit machinery of the country." Id. at 2o2.
"
8Hearings supra note 5, pt. 14, at 1796. See note 13 supra.
"4 President Franklin Roosevelt, in a special message to Congress, urged that: "Con-
gress enact . . . legislation that will effectively control the operation of bankholding
companies; prevent holding companies from acquiring control of any more banks,
directly or indirectly; prevent banks controlled by holding companies from establishing
any more branchesi and make it illegal for a holding company, or any corporation or
enterprise in which it is financially interested, to borrow from or sell securities to a bank
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
nation-wide banking crisis had passed. In the states, bank holding com-
panies were met with attempts to subject them to antibranch-banking
laws and a few statutes inhibiting or regulating concentrated control of
financial institutions. An examination of these initial attempts to check
the rise of group banking appears warranted, for the ineffectiveness of
existing law was an important factor prompting the passage of the Bank
Holding Company Act.25 Of greater contemporary interest are statutes
specifically directed at group bank activity recently enacted in Georgia
and Illinois and the prospect of similar legislation in New York.
In a few states having antibranch-banking laws, it was early con-
tended that the holding company system is, in effect, a prohibited
branch operation. If this conclusion were accepted, of course, group
banking would be barred completely in many states. In virtually every
state in which this question has been raised, however, the antibranch-
banking laws have been held to be inapplicable to bank holding com-
panies. Moreover, the number of states permitting at least a limited
form of branch banking having steadily increased, the applicability of
antibranch statutes to group banking could serve only as partial check on
its expansion.28
A number of other state statutes, passed at any early date, would
also seem to have some impact on bank holding company operations. A
Vermont provision, for example, bars the formation of any type of hold-
ing companyn and Mississippi prohibits the operation of any bank which
in which it holds stock." S. Doc. No. x73, 75th Cong., 3 d Sess. 8-9 (x938). S. 3573,
introduced to implement the President's recommendations, was never acted upon by the
Congress. S. REP. No. xo95, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 3 (.955).
*5 See notes 28, 35, 40, 55, and 6o infra.
"8 The centralized control of numerous banking offces is the obvious similarity of
these two forms of multiple banking. That group banking was adopted to circumvent
restrictions upon branch banking seems clearly indicated by the absence of intrastate
group banking in those states permitting state-wide branch banking. The holding
company is still necessary to secure control over a multi-state region, even though all
the states within the region permit statewide branch banking. For example, each
state in which Transamerica Corporation controls banks allows branches to be operated
throughout the state. See HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note ix, at 3 8-46. CHAPMAN AND
WESTERIELD, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 128.
27 1953 ILL. ArI'y. GEN. OPs. No. 27, p. 88; cf. x8 Wis. Arr'y. GEN. OPS. 30
(1929); REP. MINN. ATr'r. GEN., p. 292 (1930).
28 In 1929, 9 states permitted state-wide branch operations and io others allowed
less extensive branching. Hearings, supra note, 5, pt. 4, at 463. By 1939, the number
of states permitting state-wide branching had increased to x9, and 17 more imposed
only limited restrictions. CHAPMAN AND WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 12, at 128.
29VT. STAT. § 5791 (947).
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is a member of a group or chain banking systemY0 In Washington, no
domestic corporation or licensed foreign corporation may acquire more
than twenty-five per cent of the stock of any bank,31 and any company
controlling a majority of the shares of a Wisconsin state bank is sub-
jected to regulation as if it were a bank 3 2 Kentucky allows no person
to hold more than fifty percent of a bank's capital stock,33 a restriction
which would tend to inhibit group banking since holding companies
typically seek to acquire a much higher percentage of the stock of their
banking subsidiaries 4 While state legislation can adequately prohibit
or regulate domestic bank holding corporations, apparently the limited
power of the states over stock acquisitions by out-of-state holding com-
panies has rendered state legislation ineffective as a means of curbing
group banking operations 5
However, two states, Georgia and Illinois, have enacted similar legis-
lation that virtually prohibits any future bank holding company ex-
pansion in these two states06 Any company having fifteen per cent or
more of the voting shares of two or more banks is denominated a bank
holding company by both statutes, and future acquisitions of the stock
of any bank in excess of that amount are prohibited, although, a com-
pany may continue to hold and vote those shares which it held on the
effective date of the legislation.3 7 In addition, both statutes inhibit the
acquisition of over fifteen per cent of the Voting stock of any bank hold-
ing company,"8 but Georgia (not Illinois), permits the retention of exist-
ing control of bank holding companies in excess of the fifteen per cent
limitatior." Finally, in both states, a foreign company having the
"'MIss. CODE ANN. § 5235 (1942).
"'WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.230 (1955). This provision apparently is not invoked
against out-of-state holding companies, thus explaining Transamerica's holdings in this
state. See Opinion of the Washington Attorney General, April 19, 1949, Hearings,
supra note 16, at 333.
2WIs. STAT. § 221.56 (1955).
"3K. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.030(3) (1955).
"A See Hearings, supra note 16, at 135-43.
"HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note ix, at 156. See note 31 supra.
"GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2058 to 13-2o65 (Supp. 1956)5 ILL. STAT. ANN.
§§ io.x8o(x)-io.igo(6) (Supp. 1955).
T7 GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2o60 (Supp. 1956); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 10.180(3) (SUpp.
1955).
"' GA. CODE ANN. § 13-206i (Supp. 1956) 5 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 10.180(3) (Supp.
1955).
"GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2o6x (Supp. 1956). Georgia also has a provision similar
to that provided in § 3(a) of the Federal Bank Holding Company Act permitting a
1957]
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specified stock holdings in two or more banks is not permitted to vote
more than fifteen per cent of the stock of more than one such bank in
any one year, although it may continue to vote those shares which it
holds on the effective date of the legislation.40 The effect of this legisla-
tion is to "freeze" the status quo in both Georgia and Illinois, and, in
view of section seven of the Federal Bank Holding Company Act, this
seems dearly permissible.
Of special note is the most recent development of state bank holding
company legislation, for it appears to presage the first judicial con-
struction of the Federal Bank Holding Company Act. Pursuant to the
federal act, the First National City Bank of New York has requested
Federal Reserve Board approval of a proposed holding company which
is to hold the stock of County Trust Company, City Bank Farmers Trust
Company, and First National City Bank. 41 Approval of the proposal
was requested and obtained from the Comptroller of the Currency, but
state banking officials objected to the proposed arrangement.42  As a
result, the Federal Reserve Board opened hearings on the application on
January 24, 1957 .43 On January 29, however, the New York legislature,
admittedly in an effort to forestall immediate federal action,4 4 banned,
until May I, 1957, all bank holding company acquisitions, except those
effected within a single branch banking district. In the interim, it was
bank holding company to acquire additional stock of banks in which it already has a
majority interest. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2o62 (Supp. 1956). See note 83 infra.
"°GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2064 (Supp. 1956); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 10.180(4) (Supp.
1955). This provision is apparently designed to control an out-of-state bank holding
company. Its effectiveness in this regard would seem doubtful. Cf. Cannon Mfg. Co.
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925).
41N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1957, p. 33, col. 4. The combined assets of the three banks
total $7,483,000,000.
4 The objection of the state authorities compelled the Board to conduct hearings.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 3 (b).
""N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1957, p. 29, col. 6.
" See the special message to the Legislature in regard to this bill by Governor
Harriman, McKINNEY, Sess. Law. News of New York, Feb. 1o, 1957, No. i, at A-14 1
to A-142. See also Memorandum of Joint Legislative Committee to Study the Revision
of the Banking Law, Id. at A-s 5 7.
"Id. at 28-30. This legislation'amends the N.Y. Banking Law by adding a new
article, article 3-A, §§ 140-45.
New York is divided into nine banking districts. N.Y. Banking Law § 3. Branch
banking is permitted on an intra-district basis, although banks in cities having a popula-
tion of 30,000 or more may branch within the city whether or not it is located entirely
within one district. N.Y. Banking Law § 1o5.
The apparent dismay of both the legislature and the administration at the possibility
of interdistrict operations through the use of the holding company device is surprising in
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anticipated that the state would enact bank holding company legisla-
tion.4" Apparently, no agreement could be reached, however, and on
April 23, the ban on holding company activity was extended until May i,
1958.47 In the meantime, the hearings on First National City's appli-
cation had been discontinued.48  The outcome of this affair is at best
conjectural,49 but if First National City secures federal approval of its
proposal 'and acts thereon before May 1, 1958, judicial resolution of
this federal-state controversy seems certain. On the other hand, a re-
arrangement of the New York branch banking districts so as to permit
Manhattan banks to branch in the surrounding suburbs might well in-
duce First National City to withdraw its application before the Federal
Reserve Board and thus eliminate the present controversy. In any
event, the outcome should provide some indication of the Board's policy
under the Bank Holding Company Act and the permissible limits of
state action in derogation of the act. Events thus far in New York sug-
gest a perhaps unanticipated effect of the federal legislation-that of
compelling antibranch and restrictive branch banking states to reexamine
their limitations on multiple banking with the view toward liberalization
so as to eliminate the need for group banking as a branch banking sub-
stitute.50
At the federal level, no check on bank holding company expansion
was available until the adoption of the act under discussion. However,
the Banking Act of 1933 conditioned the right of certain bank holding
companies to vote shares of their banking subsidiaries upori -disclosure
of the financial condition of their entire organization. 1 Although some
bank holding companies satisfied the Board's requirements and secured
view of the existence of Marine Midland Corporaton of Buffalo, N.Y., which for some
time has controlled banks on an interdistrict scale. See HOGENSON, op. cit. supra
note xi, at 39.
"'McKINNEY, op. Cit. supra note 44. at A-x4x to A-i 4 2, A-x57.
"N.Y. Times, April 24,. 1957, p. 4-7, col. 3.
" N.Y. Times, March 26, 1957, p. 47, col. 7.
"'Another interesting aspect of the present situation is the apparent concern of the
United States Department of Justice with antitrust implications of the proposal. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. i, 1957, p. 31, col. 2. Congressman Cellar of New York, Chairman
of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, urged the
Board to discontinue its consideration of First National City's application until the
Justice Department had completed its investigation. Board approval of the application,
Cellar fears, "might well immunize" the holding company from future antitrust action.
oSee note 76 supra.
5148 STAT. x86 (x933), 12 U.S.C. § 6x (1952) (governing holding company
affiliates of national banks) 5 48 STAr. 166 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 337 (x95) (governing
holding company affiliates of state banks in the Federal Reserve System).
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voting permits, 2 this law was virtually ineffective. A holding company
could avoid having to secure a permit either by informally exercising
its control5 3 or by removing its banking subsidiary from the Federal
Reserve System.r The obvious inadequacy of this law to control
effectively the operation of bank holding companies dearly suggested
the need for additional federal legislation."'
One final phase in the course of federal action dealing with bank
holding companies is significant, for it appears to have precipitated the
passage of the 1956 act."' In 1948, the Federal Reserve Board pro-
ceeded against Transamerica Corporation under section seven of the
Clayton Act and determined that its stock acquisitions of banks in Cali-
fornia, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, and Arizona had resulted in a
substantial lessening of competition and a tendency toward monopoly
in banking in this five-state area. 7 The Board ordered Transamerica to
divest itself of all of its banking interests except Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association, 55 but the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit set aside this order, concluding that the Board's
findings of fact failed to indicate a section seven violation.59 Whether
5' See Hearings, supra note 16, at 432.
'
3 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 84th Cong., ist Sess. 56 (1955).5 Hearings, supra note 16, at z6.
"Even if all bank holding companies had been subject to this legislation, there
would still have been no supervision of their expanion nor of their control of non-
banking enterprises. Hearings, supra note x6, at 13-14.
"During all the years that the Board was working with bank holding-company
legislation, and all the years they were working with bank holding companies, we also
had it on our minds that in the Clayton Antitrust Act -We had some powers that could
compel these people to observe the rules and regulations of the administrative body.
It was only after we tried the case and submitted it to the courts, and the courts turned
it down, that the question became really urgent, because as of today there is no . . .
regulating power available to the Board of Governors to stop the increase in bank
holding company acquisitions of independent banks2 Statement of R. N. Evans, a
former Governor of the Federal Reserve System who served as hearing officer in the
Transamerica case. Hearings, supra note 16, at 507. See Hearings Before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., ad Sess. 26
(1950).
57 See the record In the Mattter of Transamerica Corporation, Hearings, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 47-76. (Governors Powell and Vardaman dissenting.)
I81d. at 72.
' Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2o6
F.2d 163, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 9o (1953). The Court of Appeals regarded the
"Board's conclusion of a tendency to monopoly in the five-state area" as basically incon-
sistent with "its (the Board's) own finding that the local community is the true com-
petitive banking area." Id. af 169.
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the Transamerica case reflects an intrinsic inadequacy of the Clayton
Act in preserving banking competition 0 or merely represents an in-
effective attempt to apply section seven to Transamerica's operations
is open to question. Nevertheless, the difficulty of utilizing the antitrust
laws to check undesirable banking concentration resulting from group
banking was clearly demonstrated. The proponents of bank holding
company legislation then turned with renewed vigor to Congress in an
effort to obtain some check on bank holding company expansion. The
relative speed with which Congress acted suggests the importance which
it attached to the Government's failure in the Transamerica case.
Although bills to regulate bank holding companies had been intro-
duced in Congress as early as 1938,1 it was not until 1955 that the
provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 began to assume
their present dimensions. To a great extent, these provisions are a
compromise of the divergent views submitted during this seventeen-year
interval by the proponents of such legislation, and, in this regard, those
which define bank holding companies, delimit their expansion, require
the separation of banking and nonbanking activities, and regulate "up-
stream" and "horizontal" loans are perhaps the most significant.
DEFINITION
Sec. 2(a) 'Bank Holding Company' means any company (i)
which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power
to vote, 25 per centum or more of the voting shares of -each of
two or more banks or of a company which is or becomes a bank
holding company by virtue of this Act, or (2) which controls in
any manner the election of a majority of the directors of each
of two or more banks, or (3) for the benefit of whose share-
holders or members 25 per centum or more of the voting shares
of each of two or more banks or a bank holding company is held
by trustees....
The percentage which the act adopts as indicative of control repre-
sents a compromise of the various proposals with respect to this aspect
of the definition. The Banking Act of 1933 characterized as holding
company affilates those companies holding at least fifty per cent of the
stock of a Federal Reserve System bank. 2 Proponents of bank holding
"Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerca Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 79, 28
(1953).
"
1See note 24, supra.
62 4 8 STAT. x62 (1933), -2 U.S.C. § -2 a(00() (-952).
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company legislation, however, recognized that even with a minority
holding, a parent company could often effectively control its subsidiaries,
especially if the voting shares of the latter were widely dispersed.63 This
possibility dearly justifies the twenty-five per cent requirement, although
the major bank holding companies existing today would be fully cov-
ered by a higher figure. 4 On the other hand, the adoption of a lesser
percentage would unnecessarily extend the coverage of the act and con-
comitantly increase the burden of the administering agency. 5
Significantly, those companies controlling only one bank are not
covered by the act. The purposes for which many of these banks were
formed and are operated is noted in support of this limitation, 5 and it
is obvious, of course, that the one-bank holding company poses no mul-
tiple banking threat. Yet, regulation of bank holding company ex-
pansion is only one objective of the act. It is also designed to compel
the separation of banking from nonbanking enterprises and this goal is
at least partially defeated by excluding controllers of a single bank
from the scope of the act0 7 However, the political obstacles to their
inclusion,"" coupled with their limited impact on the national banking
community, 9 serve as explanation and, perhaps, justification for the
exemption of one-bank holding companies.
A conspicuous omission in the definition section is the provision, ap-
pearing in a number of earlier proposals, authorizing the administering
agency to designate as a bank holding company any company exercising
a "controlling influence over two or more banks.""0 Significantly, the
' Bills previously introduced to regulate bank holding companies had included even
a smaller figure. E.g., S. 829, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. § 3(a)(1) (x947) (1o%), Hear-
ings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 8oth Cong., ist Sees.
I (1947)i H.R. 6504, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(x) (1952) (i5%), Hearings
Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952).
64 See, Hearings, supra note x6, at 35-43.
e" Cf. Hearings, supra note 16, at is.
66 See Hearings, supra note 16, at 569.
0' d. at 15.
""At least 1 16 additional companies would be affected by defining a bank holding
company as the controller of a single bank. 102 CONG. REC. 6219 (daily ed. April
25, 1956). Senator Morse of Oregon remarked in debate on the Senate floor: "There
is a feeling that we will not get any legislation at all if we have the one-bank definition
which the Federal Reserve Board recommends. I will not say more. I do not think I
need to say more." Id. at 62z8.
" Since the relationship of a single bank with its nonbanking controller can be
closely scrutinized by the authorities of the state in which the bank operates, there is not
here needed the federal regulation which interstate group banking demands.
7°E.g. S. 88o, 84 th Cong., ist. Sess. § 3(a) (1955), Hearings Before a Subcom.
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agencies charged by these prior bills with the responsibility of admin-
istering bank holding company legislation consistently opposed this
vague grant of administrative discretion, 71 and the express definition
enacted seems far more desirable.
EXEMPTIONS
A number of companies are exempted by the act either because they
perform legitimate business functions or are already subject to similar
regulation, or because their very nature obviates the need for admin-
istrative supervision. A bank owning bank stock in a fiduciary capacity,
unless holding for the benefit of its own shareholders, is exempted, lest
the act interfere with normal fiduciary services. 72 Underwriters of
securities issues, who might otherwise be encompassed by the definition,
are exempt if they dispose of securities obtained in the underwriting
operation within a reasonable time."' Similarly, no company formed
solely to. solicit proxies is to be regarded as a bank holding company,
despite its temporary control of the voting rights of shares acquired in
the course of the solicitation.74 A limited exemption is also afforded
companies already subject to regulation under the Investment Com-
pany Act of I94O. 75 A curious exemption is given to companies if at
least eighty per cent of their assets are agricultural holdings.76 Also
mittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., ist Sess. 39
(19s5); H.R. 6504, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (1952), Hearing Before the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952).
' Hearings, supra note 6, at s -
"Bank Holding Company Act of z956 § z(a) (A). See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955).
"Banking Holding Company Act of z956 § z(a) (C). See S. REP. No. zo95, op.
cit. supra note 71 at 6.
"Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § z(a) (B). See S. REP. No. 1095, op.
cit. supra note 71 at 6.
"Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § z(a) (B). "(N)o company shall be a
bank holding company which is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
and was so registered prior to May i5, 1955 (or which is affiliated with any such
company in such manner as to constitute an affiliated company within the meaning
of such Act), unless such company (or such affiliated company), as the case may be,
directly owns z5 per centum or more of the voting shares of each of two or more
banks. .. 2 (Emphasis added.) This is one of a number of carefully tailored pro-
visions in the Act, this one exempting the Equity Corporation which, indirectly,
through its subsidiary, The Morris Plan Corporation of America, controls ten banks.
Other Equity subsidiaries are engaged in extensive nonbanking activities. See Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 83 d Cong., ist Sess., Pt. V,
at 524, 537 (1953).
"Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § z(a) (E). This amendment was offered
during Senate debate by Senator Holland of Florida who frankly admitted that it is
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exempted are corporations the majority of whose shares are owned by a
state or the federal government and nonprofit organizations operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. 7
EXPANSION
Implementing the regulatory objectives of the act, is section three,
which provides for administrative control of future expansion of bank
holding companies. Prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board is
now required:78
(i) for any action which results in a company becoming a bank
holding company under section 2(a) of the Act; (2) for any bank
holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or con-
trol of any voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition,
such company will directly or indirectly own or control more
than five per centum of the voting shares of such bank; (3) for
any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof, other than a
bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank;
or (4) for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate
with any other bank holding company.
Subsection (i), thus, provides for regulated entry of new holding
companies into the banking field. Substantially identical sections have
appeared in early proposed legislation dealing with bank holding com-
panies.79 Subsection (2), in effect, controls the future expansion of
existing holding companies. Significantly, however, approval is required
of an acquisition resulting in five per cent control despite the twenty-five
per cent control figure adopted in the definition section. The adoption
of this lower figure is designed to insure adequate control over the future
expansion of existing bank holding companies, while eliminating the
necessity for approval of bank stock acquisitions effected solely for in-
vestment purposes.80 . Regulation of the acquisition of banks through
the purchase of assets is provided by subsection (3) when the acquiring
designed to exempt Consolidated Naval Stores Company, a Florida corporation less
than zoo. of whose assets are in bank stock. boz CONG. REC. 619i (daily ed. April
24,' x956).
7 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § z(b).
" Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(a).
79See e.g., S. 88o, 84th Cong., ist Sess. § 5 (955), Hearings, op. cit. supra
note 69 at 395 H.R. 6504, 87d Cong., zd Sess. § 5(a) (1952), Hearings, op. cit. supra
note 69 at z (95z).
8 0 Hearings, supra note x6, at 16.
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entity is the holding company or a nonbanking subsidiary. Asset acquisi-
tions by affiliate banks are excluded from the scope of the act, since
such transactions typically result in the formation of branches which is
now sufficiently subjected to either state or federal regulation."' Al-
though holding company expansion typically is effected by the exchange
or purchase of stock, the possibility of expansion through asset acquisi-
tion clearly justifies this provision. 2 A number of transactions which
would otherwise require prior approval of the Board are expressly
exempted in order to avoid interference with legitimate banking func-
tions and to preclude unnecessary regulation.83
In considering any requested acquisition or merger or consolidation,
the Board is required to consider not only the prospective stability and
value of the organizations involved with respect to the communities to
be served, but also the probable impact of the requested expansion on the
banking community at large, particularly its effect upon bank competi-
tion." While a number of earlier proposals for bank holding company
regulation contained no express standards governing the administering
agency's action conerning a requested acquisition, 5 the inclusion of this
provision in the act seems to be desirible as a guide to administrative
action8 6
The final subsection of section three, adopted as a late amendment
to the act, raises one of the most important and controversial questions
with respect to bank holding company expansion. 7 Effectively, this
" Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., zd
Sess. 24 (1952).
82 S. Rr. No. 1o95, S4 th Cong., ist Sess., pt. x, at 8 (955).
" A bank may continue to acquire and hold bank stock in a fiduciary capacity and
may retain any such stock received in the course of securing or collecting a debt previ-
ously contracted in good faith. Moreover, a bank holding company may acquire addi-
tional shares of a bank in which it has the majority of the voting shares prior to such
acquisition. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(a) (A) (B).
s, Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(c).
See, e.g., S. 88o, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. (955), Hearings, op. cit. supra note 69
at 40; S. 118, 83 d Cong., ist Sess. (1953), Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 83d Cong., ist Sess., pt. 3, at 26x-67 (1953).
" Federal Reserve Board spokesmen had repeatedly urged that such standards be
expressed in the act. See, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 83d Cong., ist Sess., pt. x, at 16 (1953).
" "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application shall be ap-
proved under this section which will permit any bank holding company or any sub-
sidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all or
substantially all of the assets of any additional bank ldcated outside of the State in which
such bank holding company maintains its principal place of business or in which it
conducts its principal operations unless the acquisition . . . is specifically authorized
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subsection precludes interstate expansion of bank holding companies.
While holding company banks in states permitting some form of branch
banking may "branch" to the extent permitted by state law, even though
outside the state in which the holding company principally operates, all
other interstate expansion is effectively "frozen.""' Thus, in states other
than that of the holding company's principal operations, no additional
banks can be now acquired. This provision, while somewhat less re-
strictive, is suggestive of earlier proposals designed to tie holding com-
pany expansion to state branch banking laws. 9
Alarm at the possibility of banking concentration on a national scale
through the holding company device has prompted numerous attempts
to include a categorical limitation as to bank holding company expansion
in proposed bills dealing with this problem. 90 Just as consistently, the
federal administrative agencies primarily concerned with banking have
opposed any arbitrary restriction of group banking to the intrastate
level.91 Even if the fear of administrative acquiescence in the develop-
ment of a nation-wide bank holding company were justified, the effect of
the present limitation on group banking expansion is no less undesirable.
The regional scope of a. number of existing bank holding compa.ies
emphasizes that the flow of commerce and the resulting demand for
banking services take little heed of political boundaries 2 The stability
and improved service which group banking has afforded certain areas
of the nation98 may, at some future time, be needed in greater and in
by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect
and not merely by implication." Bank Holding Company Act of x956 § 3 (d).88 It is conceivable, of course, that a state would enact legislation specifically author-
izing bank holding company expansion within its borders, but the immediate and per-
haps the permanent effect of the amendment is to freeze interstate expansion by bank
holding companies. See 1o2 CONG. REc. 6138-39 (daily ed. April 24, 1956).
88A number of the earlier proposals were doubly limiting, not only restricting ab-
solutely expansion without the state in which the holding company maintained its
principal office, but also precluding additional intrastate acquisitions in antibranch
banking states. See e.g. S. "IS, 83d Cong., ist Sess. § s(d) (-953). Hearings, op. cit.
supra note'85, at 6; H.R. 6504, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § s(d) (1952), Hearings, op. cit.
supra note 69, at 3 (1952).
*0 Ibid.
91 Hearings, supra note x6, at 17 (Federal Reserve Board). Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84 th Cong., ist Sess.
82 (1955) (Comptroller of the Currency).
' Transamerica Corporation, Northwest Bancorporation, and First Bank Stock
Corporations afford the best examples of multistate bank holding company operations.
HOCENSON, op. cit. supra note ii, at 42-46.
9s See CARTINHOUR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 30.
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other areas. Regulated expansion to meet their needs would seem
unobjectionable, but this is impossible, absent amendment of the Bank
Holding Company Act. An alternative solution, perhaps, would be to
limit group banking expansion to designated "trade areas,""4 but either
congressional or administrative demarcation of such areas would prove
to be extremely difficult. Conceivably. regional, but not national, de-
velopment could have been fostered by altering the standards governing
the Board's consideration of requested acquisitions. Even if this were
not possible, totally committing the scope of bank holding company
expansion to administrative discretion would seem more to be desired
than the categorical limitation imposed by the present provision.
ADMINISTRATION
The act centralizes administrative regulation of bank holding com-
panies in the Federal Reserve Board.95  Section five of the act requires
each bank holding company to submit, inter alia, information concerning
the financial history and condition, operation, and management of both
it and its banking subsidiaries and to disclose the relationship of all of its
nonbanking organizations with the company's affiliated banks.96 To
ascertain further the nature of these intersystem activities, the Board is
empowered to conduct, at any time, a full examination of both the
company and its subsidiaries. 7 In substance, section five appears to
", See Hearings, supra note 5, pt. i, at 23.
"The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, in denominating the -Board as the
sole administering agency with respect to the registration, examination, and regulation
of bank holding companies, followed such preceding proposals as: S. 829, 8oth Cong.,
Ist Sess., 1 (1947) i S. 76, 83d. Cong. ist Sess., pt. i, at 1(953) ; H.R. 6227, 84th
Cong., ist Sess., 23 (955).
"In substance, § 5 (a) requires a bank holding company to register with the Board
within iSo days after becoming a bank holding company and to provide therewith what-
ever information the Board may deem appropriate with regard to the financial history
and condition of the registering bank holding company and its subsidiary banks, the
operation of the company and such banks, the relationships of the company with
banks and other organizations, and such matters "appropriate to carry out the purposes
of this act." This section appears to be directly in accord with H.R. 6227 § 4(a), note
95 supra, but seems to lack the specificity of S. 8z9 § 4(a), note 95 supra.
97 In addition to authorizing the Board to promulgate such orders and regulations
as may be necessary to enable it to administer the act, § 5 provides that: "The Board
.. . may require reports under oath to keep it informed as to whether the provisions
of this Act and . . . regulations issued thereunder have been complied with; and the
Board may make examinations of each bank holding company and each subsidiary
thereof, the cost of which shall be assessed against, and paid by, such holding com-
pany." There is some indication that this provision, while substantially in accord with
those formerly proposed, is too broad in its scope. As one federal agency has stated,
although the Board should be permitted to supervise bank holding companies them-
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equate the registration and examination of bank holding companies with
that imposed upon national banks, federal reserve system member banks,
and those insured by the FDIC.9" Although the Board has complete
autonomy in the administration of section five, it is required to utilize
the reports of similar examinations by the appropriate federal and state
banking authorities in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.
The deference accorded other banking authorities by section five has
received stronger emphasis in other provisions of the act, particularly
section three, which governs the expansion of bank holding companies.
For example, section 3(b) provides that in disposing of applications for
the acquisition of bank assets or voting stock, or for the formation,
merger, or consolidation of bank holding companies, the Board, in reach-
ing its decision, must consider the views and recommendations of the
Comptroller of the Currency, where an application involves a national
bank, and the appropriate state authorities, in the case of a state bank.
In the event that either authority formally disapproves a particular
acquisition, the Board is required, upon proper notification to the in-
terested parties, to conduct a hearing, °° after which it may grant or deny
the application.10'
selves, it "should not have the power to examine subsidiaries of bank holding companies
except member banks which they may examine under present law." Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., ist Ses.,
84 (1955).
"3 See e.g., Statement of W. M. Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., ist Sess., 46 (x955)- Cf. S. REP. No. 300, 8oth
Cong., ist Sess., 1-3 (947) ; American Bankers Association Journal, June x'5o, p. 44-
45.
"5 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 5(c).
100 Section 3 (b) provides that once the Comptroller of the Currency or the appropri-
ate state supervisory authority has received notification from the Board, thirty days are
allowed for such authority to submit recommendations to the Board. If, within that
period, the latter disapproves the application, the Board must notify the applicant and,
at the same time, give notice to all interested parties of the date fixed for the commence-
ment of a hearing on the application. The hearing must begin from ten to thirty
days after the applicant has received written notice of the supervisory authority's dis-
approval and its duration rests with the Board's discretion. However, it must last at
least long enough to give all interested parties a reasonable opportunity to testify. On
the other hand, if the appropriate bank supervisory authority expresses no written dis-
approval of the application, no hearing is required in which case the Board is free
to proceed in a more informal manner. This latter procedure was vehemently attacked
in the Senate by Sen. Morse of Oregon who unsuccessfully attempted to amend § 3 (b)
to read: "Provided, that the Board shall not deny any application for exemption under
this subsection except after due notice to the applicant and an opportunity for hearing
thereon." 1o2 CONG. REc. 6143z (daily ed. April 25, 1956).,
10' Section 3 (c) contains certain standards which the Board must utilize in reaching
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This administrative procedure, a significant departure from that
formerly proposed which effectively permitted such other state and
federal agencies to veto a proposed acquisition,"0 2 has received severe
criticism in some quarters on the ground that there is an inherent danger
in the commitment of bank holding company expansion to the admin-
a decision and which § 3 (b) indicates must be supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
Section 9 provides that "any party aggrieved by an order of the Board . . may
obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of Appeals within any circuit
wherein such party has its principal place of business, or in the Court of Appeals in
the District of Columbia, by fixing in the court, within sixty days after the entry of
the Board's order, a petition praying that the order ... be set aside." A certified
transcript of the record is then forwarded by the Board to the court which "shall
have jurisdiction to affirm, set aside, or modify the order of the Board to take such
action ...as the court deems proper." This method of judicial review differs some-
what from previous proposals which generally provided that any person "directly
affected" by any order, rule, regulation or determination made by the Board could
seek judicial review pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The reviewing court is empowered to correct the Board's action if unwarranted by its
findings of Tact, or based on considerations inconsistent with the policies underlying
bank holding company regulation, or unlawful within § xo(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. See, e.g., S. 88o § 9, H.R. 6227 § 9, 84th Cong., ist Sess., 4, 28 (1955)
and compare with H.R. 6504 § 8, 82nd Cong., zd Sess. (195a), and S. 829 § ii, Soth
Cong., ist Sess., 4-5 (1947).
Illustrative of the criticism of the broad review granted by these proposals is the
statement submitted by W. M. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. "It
is believed that no specific provisions for judicial review are necessary, since, even
without such provisions, any arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful action on the part of
the administering agency would be, and should be, subject to review by the courts.
However, if any provisions ... are included ... a provision for trial of facts de novo
would be at variance with the spirit and intent of the Administrative Procedure Act.
(A)lso ...instead of the vague provision for review at the instance of any person
affected, the right to review should be limited to the principals in the proceeding in-
volved2 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., ist Sess., 78-79 (1955). See also 9 STAN. L. REV. 333 (957)
for a criticism of a possible defect in obtaining review.
0
' The varied means by which a "veto" power can be given were indicated by two
proposals: S. 829 § 6, 8oth Cong., ist Sess., 3-4 (1947). Banking subsidiaries of a bank
holding company can acquire the assets of (i) national banks or district banks if
approved by the Comptroller of the Currency, (2) state member banks, if approved by
the Board, and (3) other banks, if approved by the FDIC. S. 88o § 5, 84th Cong.,
ist Sess., 2-3 (1955). (A bank holding company can not be formed, or a bank
holding company or subsidiary thereof cannot acquire voting shares of a bank, or a
bank holding company or nonbanking subsidiary cannot acquire substantially all of a
bank's assets without the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of a
national bank or district bank, or the state supervisory authority, in the case of a state
bank.)
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istrative discretion of a single agency. 03 Nevertheless, the provisions
of section 3(b) seem dearly to be justified in at least two respects: First,
because final determination is left to one agency, the administrative
difficulties which invariably attend a diffusion of authority may be sub-
stantially averted.0 Secondly, the Board's power to regulate bank
holding company expansion in contravention of state banking policies
is somewhat restricted by section 3(d), which prohibits a bank holding
company from acquiring the assets or shares of stock of a bank located
in a state other than that in which the bank holding company maintains
its principal place of business unless the acquisition is "specifically author-
ized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located."1 5
Moreover, since section seven of the act authorizes the states to enact
legislation codifying their policies with regard to the expansion and
regulation of bank holding companies, the states are enabled further
to delimit the Board's seemingly broad discretion in this area.100
DIVESTMENT
Throughout the history of group banking, it has often been con-
tended that the nonbankirig activities of bank holding companies threaten
the maintenance of sound banking practices by their subsidiary banks.107
There was the obvious possibility that the funds placed on deposit with
the holding company's banking subsidiaries might be employed by the
company to gain advantages in the operation of nonbanking interests.10 8
103 See, e.g., Statement, G. R. Bayles, Chairman, Committee on Federal Legislation,
American Bankers Association, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 83rd Cong., ist. Sess., 1i4, i13 (1953).
'o' See, e.g., Testimony of J. L. Robertson, Board of Governors Federal Reserve
System, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., ist Sess., 48 (1955); Statement by W. C. Martin, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 8zd Cong., 2d Sess., zo, 14 (1952).
... Thus, it is certain that the Board is without power to permit interstate expansion
of the bank holding company device and that, at best, the Board may be able to cir-
cumvent state policies only with regard to intrastate growth of such companies. At
present, however, this conflict would probably arise only in those states which have
demonstrated a policy against multiple banking by inhibiting state-wide branches since,
in those that have not, bank holding companies operating solely within their territorial
limits are nonexistent. Moreover, as to the former states, § 7 of the Act gives them
the power to extend their antimultiple banking policies to include bank holding com-
panies. , See, e.g., the Illinois and Georgia statutes, note 36 supra.
1o6 See note 88 supra.
" For a discussion of these contentions, see WiLLur, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1-59.
103 Ibid.
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Also, it was feared that the extension of credit could be conditioned upon
the borrower's patronization of these nonbanking subsidiaries.'0 9
Since it was believed that legislation on the state level could not
effectively deal with these problems, because many of the banks con-
trolled by bank holding companies were either national banks or state
banks without a particular state's jurisdiction,"0 congressional action was
needed. The solution sought by the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 was the separation of the banking and nonbanking interests of
bank holding companies. Essentially, the act offers the companies two
alternatives: the divestment of all banking interests, in which case, of
course, the company is not subjected to the further prohibitions of the
act;"' or, the relinquishment of all nonbanking interests, save those
which are either excepted specifically by the act or which are determined
by the Federal Reserve Board to be so closely related to the manage-
ment and control of banks that their divestment is unwarranted. If a
company chooses to retain its bank holdings, section 4(a) provides that
it shall not:
(I) acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any company which is not a bank, or (2) retain direct
or indirect ownership of any voting shares of any company which
is not a bank or a bank holding company or engage in any busi-
ness other than that of banking or of managing or controlling
banks or of furnishing services to or performing services for any
bank of which it owns or controls 25 per centum or more of the
voting shares.
S5 . REP. No. 1o95, 84th Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1955) states: "The committee was
informed of the danger to a bank within a bank holding company controlling non-
banking assets, where the company unduly favors its nonbanking operations by requiring
the bank's customers to make use of such nonbanking enterprises as a condition to doing
business with the bank." Cf. Statement of Harry D. Harding, President, Independent
Bankers Association of the 12th District, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 83rd Cong., ist Sess., 132-33 (1953).
11o HOGENSON, op. cit. supra note xi, at 156.
11
"S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., ist Sess., 16-x8 (1955). Cf. io2 CoNG. REC.
6232 (daily ed. April 25, 1955). Section zo of the Act contains amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 §§ 11oi, 11o2, and 1103 which affords tax relief to
distributions made pursuant to the divestiture provisions of § 4 of the Act. The in-
tricacies of these amendments, however, will not be discussed here.
"2 Actually, bank holding companies are allowed to retain their nonbanking assets
for a two year period which commences as of the effective date of the act or the date
as of which it becomes a bank holding company, whichever is later. Furthermore, § 4(a)
authorizes the Board to extend this period "for not more than one year at a time if,
in its judgment, such extension would not be detrimental to the public interest, but
19SA]
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Several types of nonbanking subsidiaries are expressly saved from this
divestment requirement.11 Bank holding companies may continue to
control subsidiaries which own bank premises,114 perform safe-deposit
services, collect debts," 5 hold securities in a fiduciary capacity, or trade in
high grade investments." 6
A bank holding company may also hold investments in a company
which do not represent more than five per cent of the latter's outstanding
voting securities and the value of which does not exceed five per cent
of the holding company's total assets . 7  Similarly permissible is the
ownership of an investment company which is not a bank holding com-
pany and which is not engaged in any business .other than investing in
securities, if its portfolio does not include more than five per cent of the
no such extensions shall extend beyond a date five years after the date of enactment
of this act or five years after the date as of which a company becomes a bank holding
company, whichever is later." This provision is substantially the same as those previ-
ously proposed.
1 It should be observed, that although a bank holding company's activities may
fall within one of the eight exemptions of § 4, it is still subject to the remaining pro-
visions of the act.
" Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(c) (). In addition to holding
bank properties, a bank holding company subsidiary may provide services such as
auditing, appraisal and investment counsel.
1 ibid. This section also exempts shares of stock owned or acquired in a company
engaged solely in liquidating assets acquired from a bank holding company or its
contr6lled banks. Section 4(c) (z) exempts, for a two year period, shares acquired
by a bank holding company which is a bank, in satisfaction of a debt previously con-
tracted. Exempted for a similar period are shares acquired by a bank holding com-
pany from a subsidiary which is requested to relinquish them by a fedeial or state
examining authority.
"'Ld. at § 4(c) (4). Also exempt under this section are "shares lawfully acquired
and owned prior to the date of enactment of this act by a bank which is a bank holding
company, or by and of its wholly owned subsidiaries." This provision, rejected by the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and strongly denounced in the Senate
on the ground that it is special legislation, was finally added by amendment in order
to exempt the Trust Company of Georgia. xo CONG. REc. 6134 (daily ed. April 24,
19S6). This institution is a bank which by local law is permitted to be a bank holding
company. In addition to owning the entire stock of a bank holding company which
in turn controls six national banks, the Trust Company of Georgia possesses substantial
nonbanking interests. io2 CoNG. REc. 6230 (daily ed. April 25, x956). As Senator
George of Georgia stated, to require the trust company to dispose of $9 million worth
of nonbank securities would have a deleterious effect on the market and "weaken the
banking institutions which they support and which they have supported through the
years." And, "[ilt would work a very great hardship upon one of the important
banking institutions in Georgia . . ."' 102 CONG. REc. 6134 (daily ed. April 24,
1956).
.. Bank Holding Company Act of x956 § 4(c) (5).
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total assets of the bank holding company."' Although this latter pro-
vision was designed to exempt a specific bank holding company, 119 it is
consistent with its companion exemption. Clearly, the acquisition of no
more than five per cent of the voting stock of a company is inadequate
for effective control of that company. As the Federal Reserve Board
commented, this exception1 20
... is a justifiable one because it permits a bank holding com-
pany to continue to have diversified investments where the
amount of each investment is so small that it does not contravene
the basic objective of the bill. In this connection it should be
noted that under the provisions of existing law... a holding com-
pany is required to build up certain reserves of readily market-
able stocks, as well as bonds, and there appears to be no sound
reason why this should not continue to be permitted.
Doubtless the amendment with regard to investment companies is con-
sistent with this intent. For, it
... simply provides that a bank holding company can invest in
the securities of other companies through the agency of an in-
vestment company to the same degree as, but no greater than,
the bill now provides a bank holding company may do directly.
A sixth exemption grants the Federal Reserve Board discretion to
authorize bank holding companies to retain certain financial, fiduciary, or
insurance interests which are so closely related to banking as to require
no divestment by a bank holding company.121  Since it may be difficult,
however, to determine in a particular case whether or not an activity
can be so characterized, a hearing on the merits must be held by the
Board before such retention may be authorized.
Although it is dear that the divestiture requirements of section four
should practically eliminate the possibility that a bank holding company
18 Ibid.
... The purposes of the amendment were to relieve the First National Bank Trustees
of Louisville, Ky., the smallest of the bank holding companies, of the necessity of di-
vesting themselves of the First Kentucky Co., a wholly owned investment company.
However, a fire insurance company owned by the trust had to be relinquished. ,o2
CONG. REC. 6z28 (daily ed. April 24, 1956); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84 th Cong., ist Sess., 201-17 0955).
... Comment by Federal Reserve Board, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., ist Sess. (iq95).
.. Senator Barkley of Kentucky, sponsor of the amendment in the Senate, ,o2
CONG. RFEc. 6128 (daily ed. April 24, 1956).
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may injure its banking subsidiaries and their depositors by applying their
funds to speculative nonbanking activities, Congress apparently recog-
nized that additional provisions were necessary to insure the safety of
deposits in holding company controlled banks against the injury that
might arise through the use of "1upstream" and "horizontal" loans. 22
Accordingly, section six prohibits a bank which is a subsidiary of a bank
holding company from (i) investing its funds in the securities123 of its
parent bank holding company system; 12 4 (2) accepting such securities as
collateral for advances made to any person or company; 125 (3) pur-
chasing any of such securities under a repurchase agreement; 1 2 or (4)
making a loan, discount, or extension of credit to its parent bank holding
company or any of its other subsidiaries. 27  These provisions,128 far
more restrictive than those of the prior proposals, received sharp criticism
"" Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 6. Activities which apparently would
fall within the exemptions of the operations of credit life insurance programs in con-
nections with bank loans and plans under which the insurance proceeds retire the out-
standing balance of bank held mbrtgages upon the death of the mortgagor. S. RE'.
No. 1095, 84 th Cong., ist Sess., 13 (1955). The act also provides two further exemp-
tions. Section 7 relieves labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations from the
divestiture requirements of the act on a basis similar to that which justifies the income
tax exemption similarly accorded by the Internal Revenue Code-i.e., that the income de-
rived by any such organization inures not to the benefit of any individual but to the group
as a whole. This type of bank holding company seems to be justifiably exempted for,
unlike normal bank holding company systems, their members represent essentially the
same interest groups. The final exemption, § 8, permits bank holding companies to
acquire shares "in any company which is organized under the laws of a foreign country
and which is engaged principally in the banking business outside the United States."
" On the other hand, the act does not prohibit "downstream" loans-i.e., loans
from the parent bank holding company to its subsidiary banks-for such financing has
long been recognized as one of the advantages of the bank holding company technique.
Downstream financing enables the latter to draw on the equity capital of its share-
holders and its own operating funds in order to strengthen the financial condition of
any one or more of its subsidiaries. Moreover, past practices have demonstrated that
this operation has benefited not only the bank holding company system itself, but also
the shareholders and depositors of the assisted subsidiary bank and the public it serves.
S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., ist Sess., 13 (1955).
1.. Securities include capital stock, bonds, debentures, or any other obligations.
""Bank Holding Company Act § 6(a) (x).
Id. at § 6(a) (2). Excepted from the prohibitions of this section, however, are
such securities given as "security for debts previously contracted, but such collateral shall
not be held for a period of over two years...."
127M. at §6(a)(3).
12 Id. at § 6(a) (4). It should be noted that the provisions of § 6(a) do not
prohibit noninterest bearing deposits to be made to the credit of a bank, nor do they
proluhbit giving immediate credit to at bank on uncollected items received in the
ordinary course of business.
BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT
from those who contended that the scope of the existing law, section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 29 needed only to be broadened in order
to solve the bank holding company problem. 30
The apparent purpose of section six is to prevent the possibility that,
because of overinvestment by the subsidiary banks in the securities of
each other, the collapse of one or more large subsidiaries might cause
a chain reaction resulting in the ultimate failure of the entire system.
At first glance, it would appear that the short remedy would be merely
to prohibit intrabank holding company investments. Since the com-
panies exert substantial control over their banking subsidiaries, however,
such a restriction could be circumvented easily through use of the re-
purchase device or through loans guaranteed by the prohibited securities:
The prophylactic nature of these section six provisions thus appears
justified. Moreover, in the long run, the individual bank holding com-
pany should be strengthened. For, to safeguard against possible
financial crises, the company must now maintain a backlog of reserves
sufficient to meet emergency needs of its subsidiary banks; whereas
formerly, this practice was relatively unnecessary, since such subsidi-
aries could adequately be assisted through loans from the unaffected
banks within the bank holding company system.
Despite the absence of present dangers, the possibility of excessive
concentration of banking power through bank holding company ex-
pansion dearly justifies the enactment of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956. In light of the demonstrated economic advantages inuring
to the public from regional bank holding company operations, however,
it is at least questionable whether group banking expansion, which at
present is practically restricted to acquisitions on an intrastate level,
should be dependent uppn the fortuity of express state legislation. Per-
229 4 8 STAT. 183 (933), 12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (Supp. 1956). In substance, this
section permits a member bank (i) to mAke loans, extend credit, or purchase securities
from any of its affiliates, or (2) to invest in the securities of such affiliate, or (3) accept
the securities of such affiliate as collateral for advances made to any person provided
that in the case of such affiliate, the loans, extensions of credit, investments, or advances
against such collateral do not exceed so per cent of the capital stock or surplus of the
member bank and, in the case of all affiliates, 2o per cent of such capital stock and
surplus. Section 371(c) also provides that the collateral security of such an affiliate
must, in market value, exceed the amount of the credit extension by the member bank.
This provision has not been totally superceded by the Bank Holding Company
Act of x956 since it applies to situations where a member bank is affiliated with one
bank.
'so See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 16, at 1S Hearings Before the Senate Cotminittee
on Banking and Currency, 83 d Cong., ist Sess. pt. s, at 5x (953).
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mitting the Board to authorize limited interstate growth within the less
restrictive limitations prescribed by section 3(c) of the act would appear
to be a far more desirable alternative.
While the objectives sought by the divestiture requirements of
section four also appear to be consistent with sound banking, the "special"
exemptions added to that section by amendments cannot be justified.
When these exemptions are considered with those afforded by the
definition section, it appears that Transamerica is the only bank holding
company which is required to relinquish its nonbanking assets. 81 It
is unfortunate that this well-considered, well-drafted legislation, filling
an obvious gap in federal banking legislation, also appears effectively to
substitute for an abortive antitrust prosecution.
...A few of the nonbank subsidiaries which Transamerica will be required to re-
linquish are Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, Columbia River Packers Associa-
tion, Inc., General Metals Corp., Pacific National Fire Ins. Co., Manufacturers' Casualty
Ins. Co., Capital Co., and Inter-American Corp. Hearings Before the House Corm-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 318 (.955).
The obvious discriminatory features of the Act prompted Senator Capehart of
Indiana, while the act was under consideration in the Senate, to suggest an amendment
which would permit all bank holding companies to retain all nonbank enterprises which
were owned prior to the effective date of the act. 102 CONG. REc. 6129-33 (daily ed.
April 24, 1956).
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